
Marxism and Historicism

Author(s): Fredric Jameson

Source: *New Literary History*, Autumn, 1979, Vol. 11, No. 1, Anniversary Issue: II (Autumn, 1979), pp. 41-73

Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/468870>

REFERENCES

Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/468870?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents

You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *New Literary History*

JSTOR

Marxism and Historicism

Fredric Jameson

THE RELATIONSHIP of Marxism to historicism is part of a larger problem—that of a properly Marxist *hermeneutic*—which cannot fully be dealt with here. Let us merely observe that the two thematic paths along which this problem is generally approached—that of historicism and that of an interpretive master code—form, along with the third and more distantly related theme of *representation*, the three major polemic and ideological targets of most forms of poststructuralism today, even though full-dress philosophical onslaughts on these three concepts have rarely been mounted. Still, the work of the *Tel Quel* group, Barthes, Derrida, Baudrillard, Lyotard, and others, presupposes this polemic at the same time that it contributes locally to this or that aspect of it; while the most systematic statement of the repudiation of historicism has been made by Foucault (in *The Order of Things* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge*), and the most systematic statement of the repudiation of interpretation is expressed in the *Anti-Oedipus* of Deleuze and Guattari. All of these statements, however, presuppose a more basic master text, namely, Althusser's *Reading Capital*, which, owing to its explicitly Marxist framework, is probably less familiar to American readers than other texts in French theory today. Althusser's attacks on Marxist historicism and on classical hermeneutics (which he calls *expressive causality*) are therefore basic reference points in what follows, even if we cannot here engage Althusser's fundamental work directly.¹

As for interpretation, I can only assert here what I will argue more systematically in another place,² namely, the semantic priority of Marxist interpretation over the other interpretive codes which are its rivals in the theoretical marketplace today. If indeed one construes interpretation as a rewriting operation, then all of the various critical methods or positions may be grasped as positing, either explicitly or implicitly, some ultimate privileged interpretive *code* in terms of which the cultural object is allegorically rewritten: such codes have taken the various forms of language or communication (in structuralism), desire (as for some Freudianisms but also some post-Marxisms), anxiety and freedom (in classical existentialism), temporality (for phenomenology), collective archetypes (in Jungianism or myth criticism), various forms of ethics or psychological "humanism" (in crit-

Copyright © 1979 by *New Literary History*, The University of Virginia

icism whose dominant themes are the integration of the personality, the quest for identity, alienation and nonalienation, the reunification of the psyche, and so forth). Marxism also proposes a master code, but it is not, as is sometimes commonly thought, either that of economics or production in the narrow sense, or of class struggle as a local conjuncture or event, but rather that very different category which is the “mode of production” itself, which we may therefore expect to make its appearance at the conclusion of the present argument. For the moment, suffice it to say that the concept of a mode of production projects a total synchronic structure in terms of which the themes and the concrete phenomena valorized by the other methods listed above necessarily find the appropriately subordinate structural position. This is to say that no intelligent contemporary Marxism will wish to exclude or repudiate any of the themes listed above, which all in their various ways designate objective zones in the fragmentation of contemporary life. Marxism’s “transcendence” of these other methods therefore does not spell the abolition or dissolution of their privileged objects of study, but rather the demystification of the various frameworks or strategies of containment by means of which each could lay claim to being a total and self-sufficient interpretive system. To affirm the priority of Marxist analysis as that of some ultimate and untranscendable semantic horizon—namely, the horizon of the *social*—thus implies that all other interpretive systems conceal a *seam* which strategically seals them off from that social totality of which they are a part, and constitutes their object of study as an apparently closed phenomenon. Thus, for instance, the powerful closed hermeneutic of the Freudian psychic models is unexpectedly and dialectically reopened and transcended when it is understood that such models ultimately depend on the concrete social reality of the family as an institution. As to the final stage—in all the poststructuralist critiques of interpretation—in which allegorical rewriting always presupposes some ultimately privileged form of *representation*—in the present instance, presumably, the representation of something called “History” itself—we can merely assert here that it is precisely in this respect that a Marxist hermeneutic can be radically distinguished from all the other types enumerated above, since its “master code” or transcendental signified is precisely not given as a representation but rather as an *absent cause*, as that which can never know full representation. I must here limit myself to a formula I have proposed elsewhere, namely, that History is not in any sense itself a text or master text or master narrative, but that it is inaccessible to us except in textual or narrative form, or, in other words, that we approach it only by way of some prior textualization or narrative (re)construction.

These preliminary remarks about the problem of interpretation would therefore seem to have restructured in advance the other related problem which is our official subject here, namely, that of historicism, to which we now turn. I will speak in a moment about the curious destiny of this term, which cannot today be pronounced without furtively turning up one's lapels and glancing over one's shoulder. Let us for the moment construe this problem in a more empirical or commonsense fashion as being simply that of our relationship to the past, and of our possibility of understanding the latter's monuments, artifacts, and traces.

The dilemma of any "historicism" can then be dramatized by the peculiar, unavoidable, yet seemingly unresolvable alternation between Identity and Difference. This is indeed the first arbitrary decision we are called on to make with respect to any form or object from out of the past, and it is a decision which founds that contact: so that on the one hand, as with Sartrean freedom, we cannot *not* opt for one or the other of these possibilities (even when for the most part we remain oblivious of a choice made in an unthematized and unreflexive way), while on the other, the decision itself, since it inaugurates the experience, is something like an absolute presupposition which is itself beyond any further philosophical argument (thus, we cannot appeal to any empirical findings about the past, since they are themselves grounded on this initial presupposition). That this is meanwhile an intolerable option may quickly be conveyed by an oversimplified demonstration: if we choose to affirm the Identity of the alien object with ourselves—if, in other words, we decide that Chaucer, say, or a steatopygous Venus, or the narratives of nineteenth-century Russian gentry, are more or less directly or intuitively accessible to us with our own cultural *moyens du bord*—then we have presupposed in advance what was to have been demonstrated, and our apparent "comprehension" of these alien texts must be haunted by the nagging suspicion that we have all the while remained locked in our own present—the present of the *société de consommation* with its television sets and superhighways, its Cold War, and its postmodernisms and poststructuralisms—and that we have never really left home at all, that our feeling of *Verstehen* is little better than mere psychological projection, that we have somehow failed to touch the strangeness and the resistance of a reality genuinely different from our own. Yet if, as a result of such hyperbolic doubt, we decide to reverse this initial stance, and to affirm, instead and from the outset, the radical Difference of the alien object from ourselves, then at once the doors of comprehension begin to swing closed and we find ourselves separated by the whole density of our own culture from objects or cultures thus

initially defined as Other from ourselves and thus as irremediably inaccessible.

The status of the classical world has long been paradigmatic of this dilemma. When Greek forms and Latin texts were felt as classical for us, what was affirmed was not merely the Identity of these formal languages and sign systems with our own aesthetic values and ideals, but rather also, and through the symbolic medium of the aesthetic experience, a whole political analogy between two forms of social life. This we are today in a position to grasp better, when Greek forms—and the ideal of classical beauty that derives from them and of which the art of Raphael has generally been taken as the supreme embodiment—come to be felt as insipid and when the temptation arises to rewrite them more “strongly” in terms of Difference. Then the Nietzschean reassertion of the Dionysian and of the orgiastic counter-religion of the mysteries, the ritual studies of the Cambridge school, Freud himself (and Lévi-Strauss’s rewriting of the Oedipus legend in terms of primitive myth), decisive reversals in classical scholarship, such as the work of George Thompson, Dodds’s *The Greeks and the Irrational*, or the newer French classical scholarship; above all, perhaps, contemporary aesthetic reinterpretations of the Greek fact, such as Karl Orff’s opera *Antigone*—all converge to produce an alternative Greece, not that of Pericles or the Parthenon, but something savage or barbaric, tribal or African, or Mediterranean-sexist—a culture of masks and death, ritual ecstasies, slavery, scapegoating, phallocratic homosexuality, an utterly non- or anticlassical culture to which something of the electrifying otherness and fascination, say, of the Aztec world, has been restored. That this powerful counter-image is no less conditioned by our own collective fantasies than the “edle Einfalt und stille Grösse” of the Apollonian classicism which it replaced, may be deduced from its kinship with other persistent historical motifs, such as the constellation of “totalitarian” fantasies expressed in *1984*, images of Wittvogel’s *Oriental Despotism*, popular representations of Stalinist “bureaucracy” and of the cyclical return (particularly in science fiction) of various images of imperial domination and of archaic power systems. Nonetheless, the content of these new motifs allows us to reevaluate the older vision of the classical world, which now proves to be less a matter of individual taste than rather a whole social and collective mirror image, in which the production of a new artistic style—neoclassicism—comes to serve as the vehicle for political legitimation: now it is a whole dominant social class, the English aristocratic oligarchy as it persists as a privileged enclave within the hostile environment of industrialization and commerce and the alien element of a brutalized and mentally and

corporeally alienated proletariat, which contemplates its own ideal image in and is validated by the culture of a slaveholding aristocratic polis from which only the cultural forms themselves triumphantly survive.

It is clear that these two images of the classical world—that of Identity and that of Difference, that of the harmonious polis and that of the “Orientalism” of a radically alien form of social life—float side by side as alternative worlds which can never intersect. That both are profoundly ideological visions should not encourage us too rapidly to conclude that a “value-free” and henceforth “scientific” historiography is capable of freeing us from the binary opposition of Identity and Difference, and of piercing such ideological representations in order to replace them with an “objective” account of the realities of the ancient world. Perhaps on the contrary we need to take into account the possibility that our contact with the past will always pass through the imaginary and through its ideologies, will always in one way or another be mediated by the codes and motifs of some deeper historical classification system or *pensée sauvage* of the historical imagination, some properly political unconscious. This is at any rate the hypothesis we will now want to explore.

II

I will begin by suggesting that the traditional “solutions” to the dilemma of historicism are fourfold, and indeed organize themselves into something like a *combinatoire* or structural permutation scheme. It is, however, sufficient to enumerate these possibilities—which I will call antiquarianism, existential historicism, structural typology, and Nietzschean antihistoricism—to note that two of these positions amount essentially to refusals or repudiations of the problem itself.

This refusal may be observed most immediately in simple antiquarianism, for which the past does not have to justify its claim of interest on us, nor do its monuments have to present their credentials as proper “research subjects” or furnish appropriate reasons for a passionate commitment to *The Faerie Queene* or to nineteenth-century industrial novels, which now—validated as sheer historical facts with the irrevocable claim on us of all historical fact—lead a ghostly second existence as mere private hobbies. One is tempted to say that this position “solves” the problem of the relationship between present and past by the simple gesture of abolishing the present as such; and that its emblem might well be found in Melville’s “late consumptive usher to a grammar school [who] loved to dust his old grammars; it some-

how mildly reminded him of his mortality.” The graduate school anxieties of the first scene of Goethe’s *Faust* sufficiently express the asphyxiating distress of this position, to which Nietzsche’s “Use and Abuse of History” then comes as a fairly predictable dialectical reaction and counter-blast.

Yet it should not be thought that the antiquarian position is utterly without theoretical justification, even though such justification may take the form of the repudiation of theory as such. It is in fact the cultural equivalent and afterimage of a far more powerful ideology in the realm of historiography itself, namely, of empiricism proper. It should not be necessary today to rehearse the many powerful indictments that have been made of empirical and empiricist historiography, which can be resumed by the twin diagnosis that the repudiation of theory is itself a theory, and that the concept of the objective “fact” is itself a theoretical construct. I will therefore limit myself to observing that the empiricist position is essentially a second-degree, reactive, critical, or demystifying one, a form of what Deleuze and Guattari conveniently term the “decoding” of preexistent, conventionally received interpretive codes, whether they be those of folk and popular legend (as in ancient historiography), or essentially theological visions of history (as in Enlightenment historiography), of the naive chronicle narratives of the deeds and destinies of the great (as in the nascent social history of the nineteenth century), or of a hegemonic Marxian vision of history in the present day.³ If this is so, however, then empirical historiography or antiquarianism is never a first-degree position in its own right, but rather presupposes for its own vitality as a stance the existence of those other visions of history which its mission lies in subverting.

III

The first theoretical stance towards the past which has genuine content will therefore be what we here call *existential historicism*, a term which, now designating an ideological position in its own right and a whole theoretical program, rather than a conceptual dilemma, demands, owing to the well-nigh universal stigmatization of these words, some preliminary comment.⁴ The postcontemporary reader can still sense something of the irony of this reversal by juxtaposing Auerbach’s celebration of German historicism with Althusser’s canonical onslaught on what he understands this term to imply: it will then be seen that something quite different is meant by these two authors, but that the term has, for better or for worse, become an ideological and

polemic battleground whose framework must, at least for the moment, be respected.

The poststructural attack on “historicism,” which emerges from a no less problematic affirmation of the priority of “synchronic” thought, can best be resumed in my opinion as a repudiation of two related and essentially *narrative* forms of analysis which can be termed the *genetic* and the *teleological* respectively. This second term may be resumed most rapidly, for it amounts to little more than the reappearance, within a Marxian (and also, today, a post-Marxist) framework, of that critique and repudiation of the idea of “progress” which for rather different reasons characterizes bourgeois thought as well from Henry Adams and H. G. Wells down to the anti-Utopian “end of ideology” thinkers of our own Cold War period. Teleology here designates the belief in any “positive” future or “end of history” in whose name you might be expected to be willing to sacrifice your own present. Salvational, “humanist,” or Stalinist, such spurious images of the future are then denounced as symptoms of an essentially theological (and totalitarian) mode of thought. As desirable as it may be to rid Marxism of any vestiges of a properly bourgeois notion of “progress,” it would seem a good deal less desirable nervously to abandon any Marxian vision of the future altogether (an operation in which Marxism is generally itself abandoned in the process). Meanwhile, if this is what “teleology” means, then it will be possible to show that what we here call “existential historicism” does not presuppose it in the least.

As for “genetic” historicism, while it may well be ideologically linked to teleological thought, which can then be seen as the former’s projection and its metaphysic, in its strict form this kind of analysis—which we will examine as a specific trope of a certain nineteenth-century thought—is not necessarily wedded to the idea of the future and of progress either, although there are narrative similarities between the two forms. What teleological thought reads as a narrative progression from a fallen present to a fully constituted future, genetic thought now displaces onto the past, constructing an imaginary past term as the evolutionary precursor of a fuller term which has historical existence. As the example of nineteenth-century historical linguistics (and Saussure’s revolutionary “synchronic” reaction against it) is well known, I will give the rather different illustration of Bachofen’s reconstruction of some “original” matriarchy, which precedes the patriarchal classical culture evident to us in classical texts and artifacts, and which is, in Bachofen’s hypothesis, affirmed as a genuine historical event or stage: “In all the myths relating to our object of study, we find inscribed the memory of real events which happened to the

human race. These are not fictions but historical destinies which people really experienced.”⁵ Bachofen’s theoretical defense of this hypothesis is the exemplary expression of the genetic or “evolutionary” method: “A genuinely scientific epistemology consists not merely in answering the question about the nature of the object. It finds its completion in discovering the source of the object’s emergence and connecting the latter to its subsequent development. Knowledge is only then transformed into Understanding when it has been able to encompass origin, development and ultimate fate.”⁶

The genetic trope should, however, not be consigned to the ashcan of history without a few preliminary qualifications. For one thing, in spite of the unselfconscious use of the term *origin*, this trope is quite distinct from the characteristically eighteenth-century fascination with absolute origins (as in the debates about the contractual origin of society, the origin of language, the creation of the universe, or pre-Darwinian evolutionism)—a kind of speculation to which Kant may be said to have put an end once and for all. Nineteenth-century “historicism,” even of the genetic kind, is, in the sense of Edward Said’s convenient distinction, less concerned with absolute origins than with beginnings, and its historical narratives—whatever their ideological inspirations—organize a world of facts from which the problem of origins has been excluded from the outset and in which we rather have to do with more properly Althusserian “*toujours-déjà-données*.”

On the other hand, it must also be observed that the genetic approach is quite different from the seemingly analogous dilemmas of a more properly structural historiography: the former works with a single term in order artificially to construct a merely hypothetical preliminary opposite term, as in Bachofen’s notion of “matriarchy,” Morgan’s notion of “savagery” and promiscuous group marriage, or the linguistic hypothesis of proto-Indo-European. Structural historiography on the other hand works with two already fully constituted terms, such as *feudalism* and *capitalism*: it does not seek to reconstruct the former as an Ur-stage of the latter, but rather to build a model of the *transition* from one form to the other, and this is no longer then a genetic hypothesis but rather an investigation of structural transformations.

Finally, in order to forestall still further confusions, it seems important to affirm, with Althusser, that Marx’s *Capital* is not a genetic construction of this kind but rather a synchronic model. Indeed, even though the reproach of evolutionism generally accompanies that of geneticism, it would seem appropriate to observe that Darwin is also—in contrast to earlier evolutionisms or later Darwinianisms—synchronic in this sense, and that the whole scandalous force of the

synchronic mechanism of natural selection, as a rigorously “meaningless” and nonteleological process, is lost when it is appropriated for the cornerstone of some vast divine master plan. What must be added to both these affirmations is that such synchronic models do not discredit History in any absolute sense as an object of study and representation, but rather determine a new and original form of historiography, a structural permutation in the latter’s narrative form or trope. It is this new antigenetic form which Nietzsche will then theorize as the *genealogy* (and Foucault as the *archaeology*), namely, the narrative reconstruction of the conditions of possibility of any full synchronic form. Thus, to return to *Capital*, Marx’s discussions of commerce and merchant capital, and his analysis of the “stage” of primitive accumulation, are reconstructions of what, once capital is fully emergent as such, can now be rewritten as the latter’s preparatory requirements, it being understood that *within feudalism* these phenomena were not anticipatory of anything, since in that synchronic system capital as such did not yet exist.

With these qualifications, we are now perhaps in a better position to raise the more interesting problems posed by the genetic trope, which do not involve its “truth” or “falsity” but rather arise only after we have decided that this form of thinking is ideological or inadequate. Saussure’s own expression of impatience—“much against my own inclination all this will end up with a book in which I will explain without any passion or enthusiasm how there is not a single term used in linguistics today which has any meaning for me whatsoever”⁷—suggests a more satisfactory way of historicizing the genetic trope, namely, to ask ourselves what this particular “meaning-effect” or “understanding-effect” must have been in the first place, and how it was that intelligent people felt satisfied with the kind of historical narrative it provided them. At that point, it might well prove possible to grasp the genetic trope as the conceptual hypostasis and phenomenological projection of a life experience unique to the industrializing nations of nineteenth-century capitalism, of the gradual dissolution of the older precapitalist *Gemeinschaften* of traditional village life and their replacement, within the unity of a single lifetime and a single biographical experience, by the nascent industrial city. For subjects whose life experience thus, unlike the inhabitants of relatively static precapitalist societies, and unlike those of the postnatural *société de consommation* of the present day, includes both of these terms and spans two distinct social formations, it would not seem farfetched to suppose that the empty form of the genetic trope might have provided a satisfying way of thinking the two terms together and thereby of resolving, by way of something like a conceptual narrative

mechanism, the lived contradiction of “modernization” itself, as the bourgeois cultural revolution is often euphemistically termed today. However this may be, such a regrounding of the “false consciousness” of the genetic trope in a concrete historical situation has the additional merit for us, in the present context, of suggesting a historicizing operation and a model of a different possible “historicism” which has nothing in common with the genetic approach itself.

IV

With such a model we may now leave genetic or teleological “historicism” behind and examine that quite different theoretical stance which is existential historicism proper. Its theoretical origins may no doubt be fixed in the work of Dilthey, and beyond it, perhaps, in Ranke’s great dictum that “every age is immediate to God” (or in other words, that every culture is immanently comprehensible in its own terms). The fundamental practitioners of existential historicism are then surely the cultural historians, linguists, and iconologists of the great and now virtually extinct tradition of German philology, of which Auerbach and Spitzer, and in the history of art, Panofsky and the work of the Warburg Institute, remain the most vital presences in English-language cultural study. But we must not forget to mention the original forms taken by this historicism in other national traditions, most notably Croce, Collingwood, and the important Spanish variant expressed in the work of Ortega and Americo Castro. Yet from an institutional point of view, the most powerful and authoritative monument to existential historicism is not to be found in the official “humanities,” but rather in American anthropology, in the school of Franz Boas, explicitly antigenetic and antievolutionist, in which the range of historical experience open to existential historicism is broadened out to include the whole range of “primitive” cultures as such.⁸ This is perhaps also the place to observe that, however “teleological” the form in which Hegel’s histories proper are narrated (as the realization in matter of World Spirit), the much maligned concept of Absolute Spirit cannot accurately be assimilated to some final stage of History, but rather is meant to describe the historian’s mind as it contemplates the variety of human histories and cultural forms.

Such names—in particular that of Boas—should warn us then that existential historicism does not involve the construction of this or that linear or evolutionary or genetic history, but rather designates something like a transhistorical event: the experience, rather, by which

historicity as such is manifested, by means of the contact between the historian's mind in the present and a given synchronic cultural complex from the past. This is to say that the methodological spirit of existential historicism may be described as a historical and cultural aestheticism. On the one hand, as in classical German aesthetics itself, all praxis is in this experience suspended (whence the well-known Hegelian formulas of the "Sunday of life," and the dusk in which Minerva's owl takes flight). Meanwhile, the quality of rapt attention which existential historicism brings to the objects of its study—texts as expressions of moments of the historical past, or of unique and distant cultures—is essentially that of aesthetic appreciation and recreation, and the diversity of cultures and historical moments becomes thereby for it a source of immense aesthetic excitement and gratification. These twin constitutive strengths of existential historicism are also, as we shall see in a moment, the places of its theoretical and ideological flaws. Already, in the face of the well-nigh infinite variety of cultures, it is clear that existential historicism requires some principle of unity in order to prevent its vision from collapsing into the sheer mechanical and meaningless succession of facts of empiricist historiography (where History, as one expert remarked, is just "one damned thing after another"). This principle of unity, or in other words the ideological underpinning of existential historicism, is then derived from German *Lebensphilosophie*, in which the infinite multiplicity of human symbolic acts is the expression of the infinite potentialities of a nonalienated human nature. The experience of historicity then restores something of this richness to a present in which few enough of those potentialities are practically available to any of us.

For existential historicism, then, the past has vital urgency for us, and it is this urgency which, distinguishing this stance from that of simple antiquarianism, surely needs to be retained in any more adequate "solution" to the dilemma of historicism proper. In this sense, whatever its theoretical contradictions, existential historicism must be honored as an experience, indeed, as the fundamental inaugural experience of history itself, without which all work in culture must remain a dead letter. There can indeed be no cultural investigation worthy of the name, let alone any history proper, that does not breathe something of the spiritual enthusiasm of this tradition for the traces that life has left behind it, something of its visionary instinct for all of the forms of living praxis preserved and still instinct within the monuments of the past.

Nor does the past itself remain unmodified by this experience. Rather, the historicist act revives the dead and reenacts the essential mystery of the cultural past which, like Tiresias drinking the blood, is momentarily returned to life and warmth and allowed once more to

speak its mortal speech and to deliver its long-forgotten message in surroundings unfamiliar to it. As I have mentioned the Germans and the Spaniards, the Italians and the English, it may be appropriate to dramatize this astonishing moment of the exchange of forces between present and past through the voice of its supreme French embodiment, and to reread the lines in which Michelet—arriving at the night of 4 August 1789, in his great narrative, at the sudden and irrevocable dissolution of the *ancien régime* and the feudal world, and the unexpected emergence of “modern times”—salutes a past become present once again:

Que vous avez tardé, grand jour! combien de temps nos pères vous ont attendu et rêvé! . . . L'espoir que leurs fils vous verraient enfin a pu seul les soutenir; autrement ils n'auraient pas voulu vivre, ils seraient morts à la peine. . . . Moi-même, leur compagnon, labourant à côté d'eux dans le sillon de l'histoire, buvant à leur coupe amère, qui m'a permis de revivre le douloureux moyen âge, et pourtant de n'en pas mourir, n'est-ce pas vous, ô beau jour, premier jour de la délivrance? . . . J'ai vécu pour vous raconter!⁹

[How late you are in coming, great day! How long our forefathers had to wait for you and dream about you! . . . Only the hope their sons would see you sustained them; otherwise they would have cursed life and died at hard labor. . . . And I myself, their comrade, toiling beside them in the furrow of history and drinking from their bitter cup—what was it that allowed me to relive the agonizing Middle Ages and to emerge alive, if not you, oh glorious day, first day of our freedom? . . . I lived but to tell your story!]

Yet if the past is thus construed as a *kerygma*,¹⁰ as a voice and a message and an annunciation which it is the historian's vocation to sense and to preserve, there must also come a falling cadence as this supreme event begins to fade and normal time returns: so Michelet, evoking that other supreme moment of his history which is the Fête de la Fédération of July 1790—and finding its documents “burning, after sixty years, as though written yesterday . . . love letters”—now expresses the pathos of the downward slope and the withdrawal from his vision:

“Ainsi finit le meilleur jour de notre vie.” Ce mot que les fédérés d'un village écrivent le soir de la fête à la fin de leur récit, j'ai été tout près de l'écrire moi-même en terminant ce chapitre. Il est fini et rien de semblable ne reviendra pour moi. J'y laisse un irréparable moment de ma vie, une partie de moi-même, je le sens bien, qui restera là et ne me suivra plus; il me semble que je m'en vais appauvri et diminué.¹¹

[“So ended the best day of our life.” This sentence, inscribed at nightfall by the *fédérés* of a village at the close of their narrative—I almost wrote it again myself at the end of the present chapter. It is over, and nothing of the sort will ever happen to me again. I leave here an irreparable moment of my life, a part of myself, which must, I sense, remain behind and follow me no further; it seems to me that I am thereby impoverished and diminished.]

Such dramatic outbursts, comparable only to the great trumpet call of *Fidelio* which signals the deliverance from the crypt of the *ancien régime* and the resurrection of the dead, ratify the vocation of the historian as custodian of the past and of the nameless generations of human life which have vanished without a trace. At the same time, there is already in Michelet something which inflects the stance of existential historicism in an unexpected direction, and which may allow us to sense a way out of its contradictions, which can now thereby be more accurately formulated.

For existential historicism, as we have suggested, the experience of history is a contact between an individual subject in the present and a cultural object in the past. Each pole of this experience is thereby at once open to complete relativization: to take up for the moment only the subjectivity of the historian, it is clear that given the tastes and receptivities of the individual subject, an infinity of possible histories is conceivable. It is this threat of infinite relativization which the more properly ideological presuppositions of existential historicism are then called upon to limit and to conjure. These consist, as we have said, in a certain psychology of human nature, or, better still, in a certain anthropology—the notion of some full development of human potentialities, as it is expressed diversely in Schiller, Humboldt, or the early Marx—which, an ontological presupposition, cannot be satisfactory to us today, no matter how much sympathy we may have for its vision. Here the Althusserian critique of “humanism,” and Althusser’s systematic dissociation of the early—anthropological or “existential”—Marx from the later structural and synchronic model of *Capital*, is powerful and timely; we may in our present context rewrite Althusser’s thematics of “humanism” as a warning that any “anthropology,” any statement about “human nature,” is necessarily and irredeemably ideological. This position may perhaps most immediately and practically be grasped on the polemic level, where it is clear that to any given anthropology or presupposition about human nature any other may with equally peremptory force be opposed (as, for instance, the Hobbesian view, revived by Robert Ardrey and others, of the innate aggressivity of the human animal).

It should not be thought, however, that this dilemma can be adequately solved by way of the poststructuralist critique of the centered subject: that existential historicism in its canonical form posits the historian as a centered subject of this type is evident (and were it not, the critiques of Hegelian Absolute Spirit from the most varied philosophical standpoints would be enough to demonstrate it). Yet as we have suggested, what is essential in this experience is less the construction of the subject itself than rather its enthusiasm, the spark of recognition, what would today be called its reception of unique

intensities. Quite unexpectedly, therefore, we find, in the midst of the most powerful contemporary celebration of the decentered subject, a call for what can only be called a decentered, “schizophrenic” equivalent to existential historicism. In his commentary on Nietzsche, Klosowski has admirably demonstrated the presence of the *Stimmung* as a material emotion, constitutive of the most lofty thought and the most acute perception.

“The centrifugal forces do not flee the center forever, but approach it once again, only to retreat from it yet again: such is the nature of the violent oscillations that overwhelm an individual so long as he seeks only his own center and is incapable of seeing the circle of which he himself is a part; for if these oscillations overwhelm him, it is because each one of them corresponds to an individual other than the one he believes himself to be, from the point of view of the unlocatable center. As a result, an identity is essentially fortuitous, and a series of individualities must be undergone by each of these oscillations, so that as a consequence the fortuitousness of this or that particular individuality will render all of them necessary.” The forces of attraction and repulsion, of soaring ascents and plunging falls, produce a series of intensive states based on the intensity = 0 that designates the body without organs (“but what is most unusual is that here again a new afflux is necessary, merely to signify this absence”). There is no Nietzsche-the-self, professor of philology, who suddenly loses his mind and supposedly identifies with all sorts of strange people; rather, there is the Nietzschean subject who passes through a series of states, and who identifies these states with history’s various names: “I am all the names of History!” The subject spreads itself out along the entire circumference of the circle, the center of which has been abandoned by the ego. At the center is the desiring-machine, the celibate machine of the Eternal Return. A residual subject of the machine, Nietzsche-as-subject garners a euphoric reward (*Voluptas*) from everything that this machine turns out, a product that the reader had thought to be no more than the fragmented *oeuvre* by Nietzsche. “Nietzsche believes that he is now pursuing, not the realization of a system, but the application of a program . . . in the form of residues of the Nietzschean discourse, which have now become the repertory, so to speak, of his histrionics.” It is not a matter of identifying with various historical personages, but rather identifying the names of history with zones of intensity on the body without organs; and each time Nietzsche-as-subject exclaims: “They’re *me!* So it’s *me!*” No one has ever been as deeply involved in history as the schizo, or dealt with it in this way. He consumes all of universal history in one fell swoop. We began by defining him as *Homo natura*, and lo and behold, he has turned out to be *Homo historia*. This long road that leads from the one to the other stretches from Hölderlin to Nietzsche, and the pace becomes faster and faster. “The euphoria could not be prolonged in Nietzsche for as long a time as the contemplative alienation of Hölderlin. . . . The vision of the world granted to Nietzsche does not inaugurate a more or less regular succession of landscapes or still lifes, extending over a period of forty years or so; it is, rather, a parody of the process of recollection of an event: a single actor will play the whole of it in pantomime in the course

of a single solemn day—because the whole of it reaches expression and then disappears once again in the space of just one day—even though it may appear to have taken place between December 31 and January 6—in a realm above and beyond the usual rational calendar.”¹²

Schizophrenic historicism does not change the basic terms of the historicist situation, for it still opposes an individual subject (here to be sure an individual “effect of subjectivity” rather than a fully constituted “bourgeois” centered subject) to an essentially collective object. Yet it now allows us to widen the range of effects or intensities which are thereby implied: now not merely enthusiasm of an aestheticizing type, or Nietzschean euphoria and exaltation, but also the whole gamut of quite different *Stimmungen*—dizziness, loathing, depression, nausea, and Freudian decathexis—are to be numbered among the possible modes of some “authentic” contact with the cultural past. In this sense, indeed, our contemporary distance from aesthetic historicism itself may be unexpectedly reevaluated; and the Althusserian exasperation with Michelet’s rhetoric of the resurrection of the dead, the passionate repudiation of the *vécu* and of existential phenomenology as well as of Hegelian “expressive causality,” indeed, the more general malaise and revulsion we may sometimes feel for the supreme and placeless sovereignty with which a (most often Germanic) bourgeois World Spirit dips into the cultures of the past and organizes them into “imaginary museums” for its own delectation—all of these feelings signal some electrifying and authentically historical—indeed properly *historicist*—contact with that present of existential historicism itself which has now become but another moment of our own past and which we live in the no less vital mode of the negative, or of repulsion.

From this vaster perspective, then, it would seem that only indifference suspends a lived relationship to the past that can be registered in intensities of any conceivable quality: for even boredom, in its strong Baudelairean form, is a way of sensing and living the specificity of certain moments of the cultural past. If this is the case with boredom, however, as a resistance of the organism to culturally alien and asphyxiating forms, perhaps we may want to take into consideration the possibility that indifference is itself ultimately also a mode of relationship, something like a defense mechanism, a repression, a neurotic denial, a preventive shutting off of affect, which itself finally reconfirms the vital threat of its object. In that case, the “nightmare of history” becomes inescapable: we are everywhere in relation to it, even in its apparent absences, and the therapeutic Nietzschean “forgetfulness” of history is fully as reactive to the fact of history as is Michelet’s “resurrection.” How are we to understand this “absent cause” (Althusser), to which we cannot *not* react with the whole range

of our affective intensities, and which at the same time would seem to be so charged with dread as to make the occasional prospect of its occultation—its repression or its amnesia—come before us like a momentary relief? It does not seem to me that the immemorial record of violence and the most brutal as well as the most intangible forms of domination are sufficient to motivate this mental flight, these ingenious subterfuges. Violence is a sheerly ideological category, as the popularity of this “concept” in American social criticism today testifies; and as for domination, social Darwinism and neo-fascism make it plain that under certain circumstances this phenomenon can also be contemplated with complacency or even a somber exhilaration. For Marxism, indeed, the categories of power are not the ultimate ones, and the trajectory of contemporary social theory (from Weber to Foucault) suggests that the appeal to it is often strategic, and involves a systematic displacement of the Marxian problematic. No, the ultimate form of the “nightmare of history” is rather the fact of labor itself, and the intolerable spectacle of the backbreaking millennial toil of millions of people from the earliest moments of human history. The more existential versions of this dizzying and properly unthinkable, unimaginable spectacle—as in horror at the endless succession of “dying generations,” at the ceaseless wheel of life, or at the irrevocable passage of Time itself—are themselves only disguises for this ultimately scandalous fact of mindless alienated work and of the irremediable loss and waste of human energies, a scandal to which no metaphysical categories can give a meaning. This scandal is everywhere known, everywhere repressed—*un secret de tous connu*. It is, for example, instructive that the text of Tolstoy upon which the Russian formalists founded their canonical theory of artistic defamiliarization should be a text about work—indeed, contemporary feminism makes the recognition of this labor as *housework*, women’s work, the oldest form of the division of labor, quite unavoidable:

I was cleaning a room and, meandering about, approached the sofa and couldn’t remember whether or not I had dusted it. Since these movements are habitual and unconscious, I could not remember and felt that it was impossible to remember—so that if I had dusted it and forgot—that is, had acted unconsciously—then it was the same as if I had not. If some conscious person had been watching, then the fact could be established. If, however, no one was looking, or was looking on unconsciously, if the whole complex lives of many people go on unconsciously, then such lives are as if they had never been.¹³

This waste of human life—what Tillie Olsen has called the *silences* into which such large parts of so many people’s lives, and not merely women’s lives, disappear—is evidently not rectified by the self-

consciousness by which the formalists (and perhaps Tolstoy himself) proposed to recuperate it. The whole classical doctrine of aesthetics as play and as nonfinalizable finality, as well as the persistent ideological valorization of handicraft production, are also desperate attempts to think away the unthinkable reality of alienated labor. The latter finally grounds the phenomenon of reification itself, described, for instance, by the *Tel Quel* group as the “effacement of the traces of production on the object”: yet even here the category of “production” remains a still too tolerable and recuperable one, which in a pinch any modernist would be willing to salute. The deeper hold of reification lies in its promise to obliterate from the object world that surrounds us the dizzying and culpabilizing presence of the stored alien labor of other people.

Neither the complacent aestheticizing contemplation of existential historicism proper, nor the more manic and Nietzschean exaltation of schizophrenic historicism, resolves the fundamental imbalance of such views of historical experience, which oppose the response of an individual subject to the collective realities of any moment of the past. It is precisely at this point that Michelet’s inflection of such historicism suggests a rather different solution: in Michelet, indeed, the present of the observer-historian, far from being placeless, is doubly inscribed in the text as a concrete situation. It is above all the present of 4 August 1789, the present of the Revolution, which resurrects the lost “silences” of medieval labor, not through any “objective” historiographic reconstruction, but by the vital *Novum* of praxis: meanwhile the politically committed stance of the historian Michelet during the legitimation crisis of the final years of the July Monarchy, the politically symbolic value of his own historiography which will earn him suspension from the Collège de France on the very eve of the Revolution of 1848, reduplicates this reinvention of the past by an active present and allows Michelet himself to resurrect that very present—the night of August fourth—which has become his own past. What needs to be stressed here is that we no longer have to do with the contemplative relationship of an individual subject to the past, but rather with the quite different relationship of an objective *situation* in the present with an objective *situation* in the past. Indeed, insofar as Marxism is itself a historicism—not to be sure a geneticism or a teleology in Althusser’s sense of this word, but rather, as I have termed it elsewhere, an “absolute historicism”—its historical grounding is analogous, and Marx takes pains at various places in *Capital* to underscore the objective and historical preconditions of his discovery of the labor theory of value in a social situation in which for the first time labor and land are fully commodified: “The capitalist epoch is therefore

characterized by the fact that labor-power, in the eyes of the worker himself, takes on the form of a commodity which is his property; his labor consequently takes on the form of wage-labor. On the other hand, it is only from this moment that the commodity-form of the products of labor becomes universal.”¹⁴ Marx’s “personal” discovery of this “scientific truth” is therefore itself grounded within his system, and is a function of the originality of a historical situation in which for the first time the development of capital itself permits the production of a concept—the labor theory of value—which can retroactively “recover” the truth of even the millenia of precapitalist human history. “What Marx’s analytical method reveals and concretely demonstrates is the historical character both of the *realities* that thought analyzes and of the *concepts* such thinking constructs to explain them. Marx’s method thus excludes from the outset any possibility for theory to *alienate itself speculatively* in its own ideational products by either presenting them as ideal realities without a history of their own, or as idealities that refer to a reality which would itself be non-historical.”¹⁵

Still, in our present context, there must remain something scandalous about this conjunction between an absolute scientific truth and its enabling situation in contingent, empirical history: the Althusserian resistance to such an absolute Marxist historicism evidently springs from the fear that, as in existential historicism generally, “science” must necessarily thereby find itself relativized. This scandal is perhaps usefully intensified by that contemporary Marxist thinker who has reflected the most consequently on the experience of the past expressed in our quotes from Michelet: “History is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now [*Jetztzeit*, or Ernst Bloch’s *Novum*]. . . . Thus, to Robespierre ancient Rome was a past charged with the time of the Now which he blasted out of the continuum of history.”¹⁶ Benjamin’s own version of the resurrection of the past—“Only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced that *even the dead* will not be safe from the enemy if he wins”—and his vision of the present—“every second of historical time is the strait gate through which Messiah may enter”¹⁷—clearly lead us out of existential historicism (and of its well-known “dilemmas”) into a different space in which for the first time the missing term—the Utopian future—is pronounced.

V

Before we explore this new historical space even in a tentative way, however, we must return to the enumeration of the more conven-

tional theoretical options on the relationship to the past with which we began. The emphasis of existential historicism on the subject of the historical experience seemed to precipitate the latter's object into an optional heterogeneity and multiplicity of possible pasts and cultures which were distinguished from the random additive multiplicity of empiricist history only by libidinal investment. It is then predictable enough to find a dialectical counter-position emerge in which it is the logic of the historical object, rather than the intensity and authentic experiencing of the historian subject, which organizes our relationship to the past. This hypothetical logic of the historical object then generally organizes itself into a typology whose semic content and mechanism varies with the level of abstraction in which cultures or moments of the past are therein described. Such a typology can take the quite different forms of Dilthey's psychological types (or Mannheim's), of the stylistic oppositions of the great late nineteenth-century art historians, such as Wölfflin, of the operative mechanisms of the Weberian "ideal types," of Spengler's stylistic classification of cultures, or, in our own time, of Lotman's tropological typology of cultures which will serve us as our principal exhibit here.¹⁸

It should not, however, be assumed that these classification schemes or *combinatoires*—here all loosely designated as forms of "structural typology"—necessarily express a radically different or incommensurable impulse from those at work in existential historicism. On the contrary, semiotic analysis of such texts generally discloses the operation of "deep" semic oppositions, which—a kind of historical *pensée sauvage*—can usually be found to project a whole structural typology of cultures imperceptible at the surface of the text and disguised or displaced by the emphasis on the sensitivity of the individual historian-subject. The importance of Dilthey was his sensing of the necessary interrelationship between synchronic *Verstehen* and a more general typology of historical moments or cultures (even though he formulated this in the psychological terms of various world views). Meanwhile, it is clear in the work of a historicist like Auerbach that his series of "synchronic" moments is intersected, albeit very imperfectly, by the structural opposition between paratactic and syntactic styles which inaugurates his work and whose historical status is never fully articulated. In much the same way, the "masterpieces" of Boasian anthropology—such as Ruth Benedict's well-known *Patterns of Culture*—in spite of their ideological stress on the infinite diversity of human cultures, can be shown to be articulated by a cultural classification system which is far from innocent.

Lotman's work is exemplary for us in the present context because it would seem to have drawn the methodological consequences of this

apparently unavoidable, yet generally unformulated, tendency towards typology in existential historicism, and to have projected the most self-conscious and ambitious program for cultural classification which we yet have. (In anthropology proper, such programs are generally hampered by the institutional restriction of ethnological materials to so-called cold or primitive societies; that is, they operate within an unreflected previous and far too global typology which is simply the division between “primitive” and “historical” social forms.) The work of Lotman and his group would appear to take its point of departure in the Marxian problematic of social reproduction; indeed, the initial definition of culture as the “nonhereditary memory of the collectivity”¹⁹ suggests a perspective in which the various possible mechanisms of cultural “storage” will be analyzed in terms of their function to reproduce a mode of production of a determinate type. This is, however, not the direction taken by Lotman’s work, nor does the preliminary restriction of his studies to the field of Slavic or Russian cultural history compel this perspective, insofar as such materials thereby find themselves reduced to documents from only two modes of production—feudalism and capitalism (I do not know of any cultural-typological work of this school on artifacts from the socialist period proper). Thus, Lotman’s initial definition of culture operates at once to bracket the whole question of the infrastructural function of culture and to determine a framework in which the various cultural mechanisms can be studied in isolation.

These prove essentially to be twofold and to generate a kind of dualistic vision of history. “It is possible to distinguish between cultures directed mainly towards expression and those directed chiefly towards content.”²⁰ Both types of culture—they are explicitly correlated with the medieval-ritualistic and the modern-rationalistic or scientific, respectively—are organized around textual constructions, or better still, around processes of textualization. But the first type of culture—that organized around the plane of expression—posits a master text (scripture) to which the other texts of culture and social life are assimilated. The basic evaluative mechanism of such a cultural mechanism will be the distinction between “correct” and “incorrect,” and the world will be articulated according to this binary opposition, in which the “true” text or true culture—the culture of belief—is opposed to the false texts and cultures of heresies, superstitions, and the like.

Meanwhile, a certain conception of textuality organizes modern or rationalistic culture as well; but in this case, the opposite of the equivalent “master text” (scientific rationality) is not another heretical text, but merely the nontextualized, entropy, or disorder. Here the re-

productive mechanism of culture is not directed toward the replication of the sacred text, but rather toward the imperializing transformation of everything which is as yet a nontext into the new master text of scientific rationality; and the evaluative system of such a mechanism is based on conceptions of rules and method, rather than conceptions of “correctness” or “incorrectness” (an opposition which might be reformulated in terms of the ethical binary of “good” and “evil”).

It is apparent that this global opposition is a more complex expression of the classical linguistic or tropological distinction between metaphor and metonymy associated with the name of Roman Jakobson: the cultural production of a culture organized around a master text or scripture will then be a process of metaphorical ordering, while that of a culture of textualizing rules will reveal the mechanism of a kind of metonymic reclamation, in which ever greater quantities of content are drawn into the system. The obvious danger of such a stark opposition lies in its recuperation by this or that “natural” or “metaphysical” dualism: thus, in Jakobson himself, in the inaugural work on aphasia, the temptation is ever present to fold the opposition of these master tropes back into some more “fundamental” division of mental processes, into the analogical and the associative, and beyond that, into specific zones of the brain itself.

Yet tropological classification need not be a dualism, as the variety and multiplicity of tropes and figures in any manual of rhetoric might suggest. In the case of Lotman’s own work, indeed, it will be observed that other types of cultural mechanism, touched on in passing, suggest that this particular tropological opposition need not constrict Lotman’s fundamental project of a “description of cultural universals and the elaboration of a grammar of the ‘languages’ of culture [which] will furnish, it is to be hoped, the bases of that structural history which is one of our future tasks.”²¹ On the other hand, a closer inspection of the “exception” noted above—Lotman’s account of neoclassicism—shows that this promise of variety may well be an illusory one.

Neoclassicism occupies something like an intermediary position between a culture based on a master text and one based on “scientific” rules. Ostensibly a culture of rules and canons, it nonetheless posits an ensemble of classical texts which have the authority of the older sacred master text: “The theoretical models were thought of as eternal and as preceding the actual act of creation. In art, only those texts considered ‘correct,’ that is, corresponding to the rules, were recognized as texts, i.e., having significance. . . . The bad in art is whatever breaks the rules. But even the violation of the rules can be described, in Boileau’s opinion, as following certain ‘incorrect’ rules. Therefore,

'bad' texts can be classified; any unsatisfactory work of art serves as an example of some typical violation."²² Thus, in Lotman's view, neoclassicism does not present us with some new and original form of cultural mechanism (or some new trope that would break us out of the dualism of metaphor and metonymy): it is merely a structural permutation of the two older types in which the rationalistic mechanism of cultural and scientific production by rules finds itself organized around the true/false, correct/incorrect, good/bad system of evaluation of an older sacred culture. Nor is there anything particularly surprising in this: Greimas's semantic rectangle shows us that any initial binary opposition can, by the operation of negations and the appropriate syntheses, generate a much larger field of terms which, however, all necessarily remain locked in the closure of the initial system. The stark and mythical Jakobsonian dualism—as soon as it is articulated into semic variables of the type of Lotman's "truth" versus "rules"—becomes similarly capable of generating a more complex *combinatoire* or permutation scheme.

At this point, however, it becomes interesting to ask ourselves what further permutations the Lotmanian typology can produce, and in particular how we might describe the missing fourth term of this particular closed system. Very schematically, we may suppose that to a culture which organizes its rules according to ethical or "truth" categories, there might logically be opposed a culture which organized its "truth" categories and its ethics according to rules and methods, that is, which systematically rewrote what used to be ontological categories (being, meaning, goodness, and the like) in terms of the sheerly operational ones of rules of transformation, transcoding, infinite semiosis, and the like. The kinship Lotman has underscored with Foucault's enterprise, in *The Order of Things*,²³ confirms the suspicion that this fourth and still hypothetical type of culture can be none other than the "structuralist" moment celebrated in prophetic announcement at the end of Foucault's work and sociologically unmasked by Jean Baudrillard as the very logic of consumer society itself—an autoprofiferation of signifiers which have freed themselves from the myth and the ballast of all "natural" signifieds, the moment of metatheory, in which theories generate more theories, and of some new and postmodern, properly "textual" or schizophrenic aesthetic, in which sentences generate other sentences and texts still further texts.

The purpose of this hypothetical exercise is not to impute to Lotman a view of history which he might well not wish to endorse, but rather to demonstrate that underlying every such structural typology, whether it is grounded in the mechanism of linguistic tropes or in

some other way, there can be found something from which the system was intended to free us, namely a narrative (and perhaps even teleological) “vision” or “philosophy” of history. As far as the tropes themselves are concerned, they are clearly unavailable for the construction of a typology or structural *combinatoire* unless their initial empirical multiplicity has been systematically reduced to some basic generative mechanism: this is indeed what we may observe in such contemporary rhetorical systems as those of the μ Group and in Hayden White’s “tropics.”²⁴ It will therefore come as no surprise to find that, whatever the official terms of this second underlying “system,” it must necessarily be other than tropological, since the underlying system must necessarily be of another order of abstraction than the multiplicity of forms that it is called upon to organize and to order. We must then suspect that, even if this underlying system is described in terms of “master” tropes which organize surface tropes or figures, the status of such master tropes must ultimately be sought in a wholly different system altogether. My own experience suggests that this second or “deep” system can always be grasped and rewritten in terms of something like a narrative or teleological vision of history.

Thus the structural attempt to reduce the multiplicity of empirical moments of the past or of other cultures to some fundamental typology or system would seem to be a failure, insofar as the surface categories of such narrative history find themselves smuggled back into the typology to lend it a generally disguised content. Nonetheless, even this apparent failure takes us a step forward, for if such categories are unavoidable, then one may at least make a virtue out of necessity and propose a structural system which articulates them explicitly for the first time. As we shall see shortly, such a system is that which is projected by the Marxist concept of the “mode of production.”

Meanwhile, we must conclude this discussion of the option of a properly structural typology of history or culture by observing the inevitable: that the emphasis of this position on the logic of the historical object determines an imbalance in that feature which was strongest in the counter-position of existential historicism, namely, the position of the historian-subject. The very conception of science—whether it be the “science” of some semiotics-yet-to-be-constructed or another kind—depends for its constitution on the mirage of that placeless scientific subject of knowledge which Lacan has conveniently termed the “*sujet supposé savoir*.” Nonetheless a certain reflexivity is posited in Lotman’s scheme, insofar as the place of the semiotician is presumably to be reckoned into the metonymic moment of a rationalizing and scientific culture: yet far from being

the structuralist equivalent of some properly dialectical self-consciousness, this kind of reflexivity would seem to confront us with the logical paradox of a class that is a member of itself. The Utopian fourth culture of Foucault—a properly structuralist culture beyond the conventional scientific-rationalistic one—is surely at least partly motivated by the attempt to break out of this bind: yet neither the problem of the historian’s place or self-consciousness, nor that of the Utopian moment, can be adequately dealt with within these systems.

VI

We must now mention, *pour mémoire*, the final option which, after antiquarianism, existential historicism, and structural typology, we have termed the Nietzschean position. Like the first of this series, of which it is in effect the inversion, this final option “solves” the dilemma of historicism by refusing the problem. In effect, for antiquarianism the problem of the relationship between past and present did not arise since for it the present had no particularly privileged status. But was it not Hume who suggested that nothing but our own prejudices would be changed by the hypothesis that the world was created a mere instant ago, and that the whole archival and sedimented wealth of the “past’s” traces—including Hume’s complete works themselves, along with the documents that register this writer’s historical “existence”—are nothing but an immense illusionary *trompe l’oeil* built into a synchronous present? Upon the foundation of Hume’s paradox, then, there rises the ultimate “position” on the dilemmas of historicism, namely, the view that the problem of the past is not a problem for the simple reason that the past does not exist:

What is the object of history? It is quite simply, despite all the elaborations, equivocations, and qualifications of historians and philosophers, whatever is past. . . . And yet, by definition, all that is past does not exist. To be accurate the object of history is whatever is *represented* as having hitherto existed. The essence of this representation is preserved records and documents. History’s object, the hitherto existing, does not exist except in the modality of its current existence, as representations. . . . What the past *is* is determined by the content of the various ideological forms which operate within the parameters of historical knowledge. The content of the past—its nature, its periods and problems—is determined by the character of a particular ideological form. The particular modes of writing history invest this or that body of representations with the status of a record. Artifacts, washing lists, court rolls, kitchen middens, memoirs, are converted into *texts*—representations through which the real may be read. The text, constituted as a text by its reading, is at

the mercy of this reading. Far from working on the *past*, the ostensible object of history, historical knowledge works on a body of *texts*. These texts are a product of historical knowledge. The writing of history is the production of texts which interpret these texts.²⁵

This position, which draws the ultimate conclusion from structuralism's inaugural perception of the incommensurability between synchrony and diachrony, is to the conventional practice of the historian as a modernist—or better still a postmodernist, properly *textual*—aesthetic is to the aesthetic of traditional realistic representation. Indeed, the introduction of the very theme of representation into the discussion throws its terms and givens into a fresh light, subsuming it under an even broader theoretical and philosophical problem. For these writers, for example, Lenin's one great historical work, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, is only apparently a work of historiographic representation. Nor does their argument turn on the economic and statistical content of Lenin's text (Arthur Danto demonstrated some time ago that nonnarrative types of historical writing can always be transformed into essentially narrative or storytelling propositions).²⁶ Lenin's work does not aim in this sense to reconstitute a (more adequate) representation of the past; rather, such apparent representations are part of a theoretical (but also a political) practice in the present, and insert themselves into an ongoing polemic: "Lenin's book is a theoretical demolition of the arguments and evidence of Narodism and evolutionism. 'Empirical' material—in fact, statistics and information, collected according to definite problems, by definite techniques, and within definite political and social purposes; Lenin had no illusions or fetishes about their purity—functions in this book as the object of criticism or as a source of illustration of a theoretical point."²⁷ To replace this interpretation of Lenin in a more familiar context, we may say that the older view according to which this particular textual signifier stands for and represents a particular signified or even a particular referent is here replaced by the view that the meaning of a signifier is generated by its work on previous signifiers alone. The classical view of this "textual" model of theory is of course Althusser's own: theoretical production is neither the representation of some real object nor direct work on the latter. Science "always works on 'generalized material' even when the latter takes on the form of a 'fact.' . . . It always works on preexistent concepts, on 'Vorstellungen.' . . . It does not 'work' on some pure and objective 'datum' which would be that of pure and absolute 'facts.' On the contrary, its business consists in *elaborating its own scientific facts* by means of the critique of *ideological 'facts'* elaborated by the more properly ideological theoretical practice that has preceded it."²⁸ Now,

however, Hindess and Hirst draw the ultimate conclusion from this position—a conclusion Althusser has not himself been willing to take—and, thereby reproblematising their own important book, provocatively close it with the following declaration: “The study of history is not only scientifically but also politically valueless. The object of history, the past, no matter how it is conceived, cannot affect present conditions. Historical events do not exist and can have no material effectivity in the present. . . . It is . . . the ‘current situation’ which it is the object of Marxist theory to elucidate and of Marxist political practice to act upon. All Marxist theory, however abstract it may be, however general its field of application, exists to make possible the analysis of the current situation.”²⁹ But if this is what historiography does anyhow—without realizing it, or under the delusion that it is “representing” past realities—then perhaps we may go on writing history as we did before; and it is conceivable that the Humean paradox would change nothing whatsoever in our life in what has become something of a Potemkin present.

Much the same conclusion can be drawn from more explicitly Nietzschean contemporary versions of this position. Let Jean-François Lyotard, in his attack on current reinventions of Rousseau, serve as the spokesman for this view. Confronted with the polemic appeal to the radical social and cultural *difference* of primitive or tribal society (expressed, in this case, in the work of Jean Baudrillard), Lyotard is willing to take this ultimate step: there never *were* any primitive societies to begin with: “Non, décidément, il faut le dire clairement: *il n’y a pas* du tout de sociétés primitives ou sauvages, nous sommes tous des sauvages, tous les sauvages sont des capitalistes-capitalisés.”³⁰ There has never been anything but capitalism as far as the eye can reach in time and space; there has never been anything but the present. Yet Lyotard’s own call for a new “paganism,” for a political revival of the old heterogeneity of the pagan gods (or “intensities”)³¹—as well as his strategic reaffirmation of the oppositional underside of hegemonic classical philosophy, his defense of the sophists and the cynics against the dominant Platonic or Aristotelian tradition—suggests much the same “libidinal” practice of the past, and of its “names of history,” whose program, whose “schizophrenic historicism,” we have already seen outlined in Deleuze.

VII

The reader will already have suspected that the Marxist “solution” to the dilemma of historicism outlined here will consist in squaring the

circle we have already traced, in positing a mode of Identity which is also one of radical Difference, and in producing a kind of *structural historicism*, in which the vital and, if one likes, properly libidinal investment of existential historicism in the past is somehow derived from or positioned within a conception of the logic of historical and cultural forms more satisfactory than that proposed by structural typology. We have already suggested that such a conception is to be found in the Marxian notion of the mode of production, whose various forms are conventionally enumerated as follows: hunting and gathering (primitive communism or the horde), neolithic agriculture (or the gens), the Asiatic mode of production (or so-called Oriental despotism), the polis, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and communism. These distinct forms are no longer to be considered “stages” in some linear or evolutionary narrative which would be the “story” of human history, nor are they “necessary” moments in some teleological historical process. The local and empirical “transition” from one of these forms to another—as in the two great *loci classici* of Marxist historiography, the transition from primitive communism to power societies, and the transition from feudalism to capitalism—demands reconstruction, not as a narrative of emergence, but rather, as we have already suggested above, as a genealogy. Meanwhile, each of these synchronic forms designates, not merely a specific type of economic “production” or labor process and technology, but also a specific and original form of cultural and linguistic (or sign) production (along with the determinate place of the other traditional Marxian superstructures of the political, the juridical, the ideological, and so forth). It thus subsumes models like that of Lotman which seek to deal with cultural mechanisms in isolation (leaving aside here the fact that Lotman’s is a model of cultural reproduction rather than of cultural production proper). Nor is there any reason why a contemporary Marxian model of social structure should not make a determinate place for the psychoanalytic “instance”—the construction of a particular “psychoanalytic” subject in this or that mode of production—and for the phenomenological—in particular, the phenomenology of space and the organization of *Lebenswelt* or daily life in a given social formation. What needs to be stressed, however, is that all of these various “instances” are dialectically modified according to the structural place assigned to them in the various modes of production: there cannot, therefore, be any question of the projection backwards into radically different social formations of a concept of “production” drawn from capitalism,³² any more than a dialectical perspective can accept the ahistorical assumption of certain psychoanalytic schools that the constituted subject, the unconscious, the

Oedipus complex, desire, and the like—all theorized from modern or bourgeois psychic materials—remain constant throughout history.

As with my initial remarks on interpretation, I cannot do any more than assert here answers to problems about the nature of a mode of production which I will argue in more detail elsewhere. Chief among such problems is the status of this concept itself, about which it has been observed—in a number of critiques of the formulations of this concept in Althusser and Balibar³³—that it is something like Spinoza’s “eternity,” a timeless structure which must apparently effortlessly reproduce itself without change across the empirical vicissitudes of human history. Nor is the conventional Marxist appeal to the complementary concept of a “social formation”—the empirical historical society or culture in which a given mode of production realizes itself—any more satisfactory as a theoretical solution, since it merely reintroduces that empiricism which it was the mission of a dialectical approach to discredit and to replace.

A solution to this problem can be sought in two directions. On the one hand, as we have already suggested, the Marxian concept of a mode of production is essentially a *differential* one, in which the formulation of a single mode of production (as, for instance, Marx’s own model of capital) at once structurally projects the space of other possible modes of production by way of Difference, that is, by a systematic variation in the features or semes of any given initial mode. This is the sense in which each mode of production structurally *implies* all the others: what is important about this from our present standpoint is that the contemplation of any given mode of production (or the replacement of any cultural artifact within its specific mode of production) must always implicitly or explicitly involve a differential relationship to all the others.

But one can also argue this differential interrelationship in a nonstructuralizing way: from this second standpoint, the hypothesis of a structural *combinatoire* is unnecessary, since each “more advanced” mode of production includes the earlier ones, which it has had to suppress in its own emergence. These are therefore sedimented within a mode of production like capitalism, in which the earlier forms, along with their own specific forms of alienation and productivity, persist in a layered, “canceled” fashion. But it is not only vanquished modes of production from the past that thus survive in the “nonsynchronicity”³⁴ of the present mode; it is also clear that future modes of production are also at work in the present and can be detected most visibly in the various local forms of class struggle. If this is the case, however, then it becomes evident, not only that no mode of production exists in any pure state, but also that we need a concept of

the same level of abstraction to designate this contradictory overlay and structural coexistence of several modes of production in tension with one another. I will suggest that this concept has been made available to us by the Chinese experience, and that this larger form, which subsumes the individual modes of production, be called “cultural revolution,” it being understood that the recent Chinese practice of cultural revolution is merely one distinct historical type of cultural revolution, of which one must assume that there have existed quite different structural embodiments at all moments of human history (thus, for instance, to draw only on familiar and traditional examples, Bachofen’s hypothesis of the triumph of patriarchy over matriarchy is an attempt to thematize a properly *neolithic* cultural revolution; Max Weber’s analysis of the Protestant ethic is a contribution to the study of a properly *bourgeois* cultural revolution; and so forth). I will add in passing that this new unifying category of historical study seems to me the only one in terms of which the so-called human sciences can be reorganized in a properly materialistic way.

Yet it would seem that this system of modes of production and cultural revolutions at best regrounds only one of the options discussed above—that of structural typology or of the logic of the historical *object*—in some more satisfactory and totalizing way, and that we have not yet shown how it is able to provide a more adequate formulation for the problem of the place of the historian-subject, or of the present, as this imposed itself in our counter-discussion of existential historicism. We have already touched on the way in which Marxism, as an absolute historicism, grounds the possibility of a comprehensive theory of past societies and cultures in the structure of the present, or of capitalism itself. Yet this would seem at best to reinvent some “place of truth,” some ethnocentric privilege of our present as inheritors of world culture and as practitioners of rationalism and science, which is not visibly different from the imperializing hubris of conventional bourgeois science, and which would tend at the same time to confirm the current line of the *nouveaux philosophes* on the innate or intrinsic “Stalinism” of the Marxian world view.

This ultimate dilemma, which turns on the status of the present and the place of the subject in it, needs to be restructured in three ways. First, we must try to rid ourselves of the habit of thinking about our (aesthetic) relationship to culturally or temporally distant artifacts as being a relationship between individual subjects (as in my *personal* reading of an *individual* text written by a biographical individual named Spenser or Juvenal, or even my personal attempt to invent an individual relationship to an oral story once told by an individual storyteller in a tribal society). It is not a question of dismissing the role

of individual subjects in the reading process, but rather of grasping this obvious and concrete individual relationship as being itself a mediation for a nonindividual and more collective process: the confrontation of two distinct social forms or modes of production. We must try to accustom ourselves to a perspective in which every act of reading, every local interpretive practice, is grasped as the privileged vehicle through which two distinct modes of production confront and interrogate one another. Our individual reading thus becomes an allegorical figure for this essentially collective confrontation of two social forms.

If we can do this, then I would suggest that a second reformulation of the nature of this contact between present and past will gradually impose itself. We will no longer tend to see the past as some inert and dead object which we are called upon to resurrect, or to preserve, or to sustain, in our own living freedom; rather, the past will itself become an active agent in this process and will begin to come before us as a radically different life form which rises up to call our own form of life into question and to pass judgment on us, and through us, on the social formation in which we exist. At that point, the very dynamics of the historical tribunal are unexpectedly and dialectically reversed: it is not we who sit in judgment on the past, but rather the past, the radical difference of other modes of production (and even of the immediate past of our own mode of production), which judges us, imposing the painful knowledge of what we are not, what we are no longer, what we are not yet. This is the sense in which the past speaks to us about our own virtual and unrealized "human potentialities," but it is not an edifying lesson or any leisure matter of personal or cultural "enrichment." Rather, it is a lesson of privation, which radically calls into question the commodified daily life, the reified spectacles, and the simulated experience of our own plastic-and-cellophane society; and this not merely on the level of content (as in Marx's familiar opposition of the object world of Greek epic to the contemporary world of the locomotive and the electric telegraph), but in the very experience of form and linguistic production itself, where the primacy of collective ritual, or the splendor of uncommodified value, or even the transparency of immediate personal relations of domination, at once stigmatize the monadization, the privatized and instrumentalized speech, the commodity reification, of our own way of life. On this view, then, as for existential historicism, our concrete relationship with the past remains an existential experience, a galvanic and electrifying event, yet one which is far more disturbing and unsettling than in the comfortable aesthetic appreciation of the practitioners of late nineteenth-century historicism. Now, on the contrary, it is the

past that sees us, and judges us remorselessly, without any sympathy or complicity with the scraps of subjectivity we try to think of as our own fragmentary and authentic life experience.

Yet it is not only the past that thus judges us; and with this final rectification we touch at the originality of the Marxist position with respect to the other options that have been evoked above. For if it is so that the proper articulation of any concrete mode of production structurally implies the projection of all other conceivable modes, then it follows that it implies the future as well and that the hermeneutic contact between present and past outlined here cannot fully be described without the articulation within it of what Ernst Bloch has called the Utopian impulse. Among the conditions of possibility of Marxism itself as a new type of dialectical thought was, as we have indicated above, the commodification of land and labor completed only by the emergence of capitalism; but if this were its only historical precondition, then it could conceivably be argued that Marxism as such was merely a theoretical "reflection" of early or classical capitalism. It is, however, also the anticipatory expression of a future society, or, in the terms of our discussion above, the partisan commitment to that future or Utopian mode of production which seeks to emerge from the hegemonic mode of production of our own present. This is the final reason why Marxism is not, in the current sense, a "place of truth," why its subjects are not centered in some possession of dogma, but are rather very precisely historically decentered: only the Utopian future is a place of truth in this sense, and the privilege of contemporary life and of the present lies not in its possession, but at best in the rigorous judgment it may be felt to pass on us.

The fullest and most terrifying form of a Marxist hermeneutic act can therefore best be conveyed by those great moments in Sartre's *Condemned of Altona*, when the implacable gaze of the alien and incomprehensible inhabitants of the thirtieth century burns unanswerably upon a present steeped in torture, exploitation, and blood guilt: "Habitants masqués des plafonds . . . décapodes . . . siècles, voici mon siècle, solitaire et difforme, l'accusé. Mon client s'éventre de ses propres mains; ce que vous prenez pour une lympe blanche, c'est du sang. . . . Répondez donc! Le trentième ne répond plus. Peut-être n'y aura-t-il plus de siècles après le nôtre. Peut-être qu'une bombe aura soufflé les lumières. Tout sera mort: les yeux, les juges, le temps. Nuit. O tribunal de la nuit, toi qui fus, qui seras, qui es, j'ai été! j'ai été" [Masked inhabitants of the ceilings . . . decapods . . . centuries, here is my own century, solitary, misbegotten, the accused. My client disembowels himself before your very eyes; what looks like lymph is really blood. . . . Answer me! The thirtieth century no longer answers.

Maybe there are no centuries after this one. Maybe a bomb blew out all the lights. Everything will be dead: eyes, judges, time. Night. O great court of the night, you who were and always will be, who are—I have been! I have been]. Yet Franz's appeal to a silent and unimaginable posterity, with all its echoes of a more properly existentialist pathos, is not the only possible figure for this fullest relationship to history. Sartre's crabs are after all our own grandchildren or great-grandchildren, Brecht's "Nachgeborenen"; and it is therefore fitting to conclude with the evocation of a rather different type of political art—Alain Tanner's film *Jonas qui aura 25 ans dans l'an 2000*—with its play of postindividual collective relationships around the absent center of birth and of a new subject to come—to convey the sense of a hermeneutic relationship to the past which is able to grasp its own present as history only on condition it manages to keep the idea of the future, and of radical and Utopian transformation, alive.

YALE UNIVERSITY

NOTES

- 1 See in particular chaps. 5 and 9 of "The Object of *Capital*," in Louis Althusser et al., *Reading Capital*, tr. Ben Brewster (London, 1970). The most systematic critique of "Althusserianism," including a powerful reaffirmation of the historicist character of Marxism, is that of E. P. Thompson, in *The Poverty of Theory* (London, 1978).
- 2 See *The Political Unconscious* (forthcoming).
- 3 On this last, see the instructive exchange between J. H. Hexter and Christopher Hill in *The Times Literary Supplements* of 24 October and 7 November 1975.
- 4 The standard works on historicism are Ernst Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme* (Tübingen, 1922), and Friedrich Meinecke, *Die Entstehung des Historismus* (Munich, 1959). Enthusiastic and programmatic endorsements of historicism may be found in Karl Mannheim, "Historicism," in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York, 1952), pp. 84–133; and Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis* (Princeton, 1953), pp. 443–48, 473–80, 546–51. The basic structuralist critiques of historicism, besides that of Althusser himself (see n. 1), are surely those of Claude Lévi-Strauss, "History and Dialectic," in *The Savage Mind* (Chicago, 1966), pp. 245–69; and A. J. Greimas, "Structure et histoire," in *Du Sens* (Paris, 1970), pp. 103–16.
- 5 J. J. Bachofen, *Das Mutterrecht* (Frankfurt, 1975), p. 103.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- 7 Letter to Antoine Meillet, 4 January 1894, in *Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure*, 21 (1964), 93. And see for a fuller discussion of Saussure's "synchronic" revolution, my *Prison-House of Language* (Princeton, 1972), pp. 3–39.
- 8 See, on Boas's antievolutionism (and its relationship to his anti-Marxism), Marvin Harris, *The Rise of Anthropological Theory* (New York, 1968), chap. 10.
- 9 Jules Michelet, *Histoire de la révolution française* (Paris, 1952), I, 203.
- 10 The *kerygma* or "message" is the central category of Paul Ricoeur's narrative theology: see, for instance, his "Preface to Bultmann," in *The Conflict of Interpretations* (Chicago, 1974), pp. 381–401.
- 11 Michelet, *Histoire*, I, 412.

- 12 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, tr. R. Hurley, M. Seem, and H. R. Lane (New York, 1977), pp. 20–22.
- 13 Leo Tolstoy, *Journal*, 28 February 1897, quoted in Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” in *The Theory of Prose* (translated in L. T. Lemon and M. J. Reis, *Russian Formalist Criticism* [Lincoln, 1965], p. 12).
- 14 Karl Marx, *Capital*, tr. Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth, 1976), I, 274, n. 4. And compare the fundamental observation in which Aristotle’s inability to conceptualize the labor theory of value is grounded in the limits of his own mode of production: “Aristotle himself was unable to extract this fact, that, in the form of commodity-values, all labor is expressed as equal human labor and therefore as labor of equal quality, by inspection from the form of value, because Greek society was founded on the labor of slaves, hence had as its natural basis the inequality of men and of their labor-powers” (*Capital*, I, 151–52). A more general historicist theory of the relationship between conceptual abstraction and commodification has been developed in Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s important book, *Intellectual and Manual Labor* (London, 1978).
- 15 Maurice Godelier, *Horizon: trajets marxistes en anthropologie* (Paris, 1973), p. 303.
- 16 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” (thesis 14), in *Illuminations*, tr. H. Zohn (New York, 1969), p. 261.
- 17 *Ibid.*, pp. 255, 264 (theses 6 and 18 B).
- 18 See Y. M. Lotman and B. A. Uspensky, “On the Semiotic Mechanism of Culture,” *New Literary History*, 9, No. 2 (Winter 1978), 211–32; and Y. M. Lotman, “Problèmes de la typologie des cultures,” *Social Science Information*, 6, No. 2–3 (April–June 1967); and for a more comprehensive collection, Lotman and Uspensky, *Tipologia della cultura* (Milan, 1975). The fundamental critique of Lotman’s theory of culture from a Marxist standpoint is that of Stefan Żółkiewski, “Des principes de classement des textes de culture,” *Semiotica*, 7, No. 1 (1973), 1–18.
- 19 “On the Semiotic Mechanism of Culture,” p. 213.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 217.
- 21 “Problèmes de la typologie des cultures,” p. 33.
- 22 “On the Semiotic Mechanism,” pp. 218–19.
- 23 See “On the Semiotic Mechanism,” p. 230, n. 5.
- 24 J. Dubois et al., *Rhétorique générale* (Paris, 1970); and Hayden White, *Tropics of Discourse* (Baltimore, 1979); and see my related discussion of White’s *Metahistory*, “Figural Relativism, Or, The Poetics of Historiography,” *Diacritics* 6, No. 1 (Winter 1976), 2–9.
- 25 Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst, *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production* (London, 1975), pp. 309, 311.
- 26 Arthur C. Danto, *The Analytical Philosophy of History* (Cambridge, 1968).
- 27 Hindess and Hirst, *Pre-Capitalist Modes*, p. 323.
- 28 Louis Althusser, *Pour Marx* (Paris, 1965), p. 187.
- 29 Hindess and Hirst, *Pre-Capitalist Modes*, p. 312.
- 30 Jean-François Lyotard, *Économie libidinale* (Paris, 1974), p. 155.
- 31 See, for instance, his latest collection, *Rudiments païens* (Paris, 1978).
- 32 A familiar objection to Marxist anthropology, most recently expressed by Jean Baudrillard in *The Mirror of Production*, tr. M. Poster (St. Louis, 1975), esp. pp. 69–92.
- 33 See, for example, Perry Anderson, *Considerations on Western Marxism* (London, 1976), pp. 64–66; and Hindess and Hirst, *Pre-Capitalist Modes*, pp. 313–20; responses may be found in L. Althusser, *Éléments d’Autocritique* (Paris, 1974), and Pierre Macherey, *Hegel ou Spinoza* (Paris, 1979).
- 34 Ernst Bloch, “Nonsynchronism and Dialectics,” *New German Critique*, 11 (Spring 1977), 22–38.